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DON'T PUT MY ARTICLE ONLINE: EXTENDING
COPYRIGHT'S NEW-USE DOCTRINE TO THE
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING MEDIA
AND BEYOND
SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIGt
For last year's words belong to last year's language,
And next year's words await another voice.
-T.S. Eliot'
INTRODUCTION
The methods by which we conduct legal research have evolved
dramatically over the last decade.2 The electronic media,3 which
include online services such as LEXIS and Westlaw as well as
compact-disc read-only-memory devices (CD-ROMs) for computers,
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T.S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS 35, 39 (1944).
In beginning research for this Comment, for example, I did not use any printed
newspapers and only sparingly referred to boundjournals. Instead, with several quick
database searches on LEXIS and Westlaw, I was able to print out the scores of articles
I needed to begin this project.
This Comment uses the term "electronic media" to refer to the new generation
of media that provide alternative avenues of distribution for the content available in
traditional publishing. These media, which enable electronic publishing, do not here
include television or radio broadcasting. "Electronic publishing" has been defined as
"the providing of traditional magazine or book-based materials with computer-aided
processes," AlanJ. Hartnick, ChecklistforLawyersforMultimediaMatters, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
8, 1993, at 5, and has been analogized to the marriage between print publishing and
broadcasting. See RICHARD M. NEUSTADT, THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING 1
(1982) (noting, however, that electronic publishing poses new and unique concerns).
The goal of electronic publishing is tojudiciously disseminate information to a chosen
audience by means of these computer-aided processes. SeeJOOST KiST, ELECTRONIC
PUBLISHING: LOOKING FOR A BLUEPRINT 12 (Routledge 1988) (1987). Electronic
publishingincludes the much-hyped multimedia. See Hartnick, supra, at5 ("Electronic
publishing begins with text. Add sound and visual images, and you have multime-
dia."); see also Susan Orenstein, Digital Multimedia Madness, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 13,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Lgltme File (discussing online newspapers as
one aspect of "multimedia").
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have changed the ways we as a society gather information.4 Al-
though these new media provide new methods of information
distribution, they also create conflicts over the ownership of the
content distributed and represent the source of publishing's "most
bitter battle in years."5 These conflicts stem from a lack of appre-
ciation of future technologies by parties to contracts involving the
freelance writer, illustrator, or photographer who informally assigns
rights to a book publisher, newspaper, or magazine. Consider, for
example, the freelance journalist in 1980 who, over the customary
handshake, sold a story to a local newspaper. Then, in 1985, when
the first CD-ROM system became available, the newspaper either
distributed the article on CD-ROM or licensed another company to
do so. How broad was the scope of the 1980 grant from the
journalist to the newspaper? Did it encompass the right to exploit
then-undeveloped future technologies such as CD-ROM, or did the
journalist instead implicitly reserve all future technology rights?
Historically, the issue of ownership of the right to exploit a
future medium was limited to the performing arts, including motion
pictures, television, and videocassettes. Electronic publishing,
however, has forced a careful reexamination of the rights to new
uses. This reappraisal has become necessary because the content
distributed in these media broadly encompasses not only all of
print, but, with the consideration of multimedia applications, nearly
any type or form of creative authorship.6 In the coming years, even
newer media technologies will continue to present new problems in
copyright licensing.
7
4 See, e.g., M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF LAW 39-48 (1989) (discussing the impact of electronic media on modern life and
the law); NEUSTADT, supra note 3, at 1 (observing that electronic publishing "may
change the way we create, obtain and use information"); see also Note, Toward a
Unified Theoy of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 450, 450-51 (1982) (discussing the development of comprehensive electronic
journal systems); Rosalind Resnick, Writers, Data Bases Do Battle, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7,
1994, at 1, 28 ("Now that computers and modems are cheaper and easier to use and
millions of people are turning to online networks, print publishers are racing to come
out with electronic editions of their books, newspapers and magazines."); Orenstein,
supra note 3 (quoting Ronald Laurie, a computer law attorney, as noting that the
"trend is toward putting everything into accessible databases").
s Deirdre Carmody, Writers FightforElectronic Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1994, at
B20.
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (providing a nonexclusive list of categories of
authorship protectable by copyright).
7 See infra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing new media technologies
such as global information networks and interactive television).
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This Comment examines the historical treatment of new-use
assignments and proposes a simpler analysis that encourages the
new uses to develop to their full potential. Part I briefly discusses
the history and development of electronic media and then examines
the conflicts these media have created over the distribution of
content. Part II considers the methods by which courts, through
nearly a century of common law, have traditionally interpreted
contracts in light of new media. Part III examines the traditional
common-law analysis and questions the implications of its future
application, noting particularly the inconsistent results and
utilitarian inefficiencies that are rooted in the existing common law.
The alternative treatment proposed in Part III favors judicial
interpretations that implicitly grant future technology rights on
policy grounds to the producer or publisher, because that party is
in the better position to exploit the new medium. Such a policy
can, in effect, subsidize infant media until they become commer-
cially viable, without reducing the incentives to authorship that are
sought by the Constitution.'
Part IV applies the proposal of Part III to electronic media in
light of their history, as examined in Part I, and then sets forth
the conditions under which courts should interpret agreements to
have granted rights to exploit works on electronic media. Part V,
an epilogue to this analysis, examines the relationship between
parties who today bargain for electronic media rights-rights to an
existing, rather than future, technology. Additionally, this Part
very briefly considers even newer media that represent the next
generation of future technologies. Although the generation of new
media examined throughout this Comment might no longer pose
new-use issues for contracting parties today (whereas they do indeed
pose problems for courts interpreting older contracts that preceded
these uses), new media will always be looming, and accompanying
them, the relevancy of future technology issues in copyright
licensing.
'The Constitution empowers Congress to regulate copyright in order "[to
promote the ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the
exclusive Right to their... Writings .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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I. THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
A. A Historical Overview
1. Online Services
Computer databases store packages of information-whether
they be newspaper articles, cases, books, or photograph collec-
tions-in digital form.9 Online services, which began to develop in
the late 1950s,"° distribute the database information, making it
available to remote terminals via telecommunications networks.1
By the mid-1960s several dozen information databases existed;' 2 by
the mid-1970s that number had increased to nearly three hun-
dred,"3 spurred by new developments and the decreasing cost of
computers.' 4 Full-scale electronic information services became
' For definitions and explanations of databases, see ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING- A
SNAPSHOT OF THE EARLY 1980s 15-16 (Hugh Evison Look ed., 1983) [hereinafter
ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING] (listing some of the different types of information that can
be compiled in database form); FRAN SPIGAI & PETER SOMMER, GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC
PUBLISHING: OPPORTUNITIES IN ONLINE AND VIEWDATA SERVICES 5-10 (1982) (sur-
veying different database subjects and the types of information included
therein).
o See e.g., KIST, supra note 3, at 6 ("The first commercial online system was
probably Quotron Systems of Los Angeles, which launched a service in 1957 that
provided electronically distributed, up-to-the-minute stock market prices. The next
major development [did not occur] ... until the early 1970s-when Lockheed opened
three databases.").
" See ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, supra note 9, at 196.
12 See Tung Yin, Post-Modern Printing Presses: Extending Freedom of Press to Protect
Electronic Information Seroices, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 311, 315 (1993). One early player
was the Dialog service which evolved from databases created in 1963 by the Lockheed
Corporation, but did not become commercially available until 1972. See KIST, supra
note 3, at 145 (discussing Dialog's evolution); SPIGAI & SOMMER, supra note 9, at 24
(noting that Dialog has since become a "large[] online reference system").
13 See Yin, supra note 12, at 315; see also SPIGAI & SOMMER, supra note 9, at 3
("[T]he online 'industry' has existed as a commercial phenomenon only since the early
1970s."). The LEXIS legal database, for example, was created in 1973, but was not
available without a proprietary terminal until 1983; the NEXIS database for the
general population was not conceived until 1980. See KiST, supra note 3, at 152
(charting the evolution of LEXIS and NEXIS). The DowJones News/Retrieval service,
the first large-scale information service, became available in 1973. See infra note 15.
14 See, e.g., ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that "it was not
until the early 1970s that multiple-user sharing of the same computer facility became
both technically and economically feasible thanks to the well-documented fact that
during the 60s and the 70s the cost of computer power dropped by around 30% per
year"); see also SPIGAI & SOMMER, supra note 9, at 3 (attributing the industry's growth
to six specific computer advancements). By the mid-1970s, data networks became
available that allowed users to affordably connect to information services, and newer
DON'T PUT MY ARTICLE ONLINE!
widely available to the American public by 1982,15 and in 1993
online services had four million subscribers.16 In 1994, the total
number of online computer service users topped 6.3 million.1
Today, the online information service industry takes in an estimated
$13.4 billion per year in revenue,18 and this robust growth is
expected to continue.19 Most of the nation's major newspapers
and magazines now appear in databases or online, 20 and the book
modems enabled faster data transmission speeds. See id. at 2-3.
I5 See, e.g., NEUSTADT, supra note 3, at 20-22 (listing the starting dates of various
large-scale information services, with the vast majority formed by 1982, and some
beginning as early as 1979); SPIGAI & SOMMER, supra note 9, at 3 (calling the 1980s
the "decade of the online publisher"). The only large-scale information service
available in the United States before 1979 was Dow Jones News/Retrieval, which
began operations in 1973. See NEUSTADT, supra note 3, at 20; cf KIST, supra note 3,
at 146 (placing the date of inception of the DowJones service in 1974). In 1982,
despite the arrival of many information suppliers, the online industry remained small:
Dialog, at the time the largest online system, had approximately 13,000 users. See
SPIGAI & SOMMER, supra note 9, at 24 (detailing the Dialog service).
"6 See Yin, supra note 12, at 317 (noting that this statistic "represent[s] a growth
of revenue of twenty-seven percent for the industry from 1992").
'7 See On-Line Services Reach More Than 6 Million Subscribers, Reuters Newswire,
Jan. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File [hereinafter 6 Million
Subscribers] ("On-line computer services enjoyed another boom in popularity last year,
[in the United States], with the number of subscribers jumping nearly 40 percent
from 1993 as competition pushed down prices .... ").
1 See, e.g., Geraldine Fabrikant, Times Co. Regains Control of Electronic Rights to
Paper, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1994, at 39, 41 (analyzing the value of the online market).
19 See 6 Million Subscribers, supra note 17 (noting that "growth is expected to
continue" as a result of"an increase in the number of personal computers that come
prepackaged with at least one service as part of their software offerings").
o See, e.g., Fabrikant, supra note 18, at 41 (discussing the many ways by which the
New York Times can be electronically accessed); William Glaberson, Times Company
Plans Shift to More Electronic Media, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1994, at DI, D18 (noting that
the New York Times plans to increase its reliance on electronic media so that
"ultimately 75 percent of [its] profits come from print and 25 percent from electronic
media," and plans to invest upwards of $40 million in the next three years to develop
its electronic services); Pat Guy, Free-lance Writers Sue Electronic Publishers, USA
TODAY, Dec. 20, 1993, at 8B (noting that "an interactive version of the New York
Times will join the list of publications available on the America Online computer
service"); Susan Hightower, Print Journalists Travel the Information Superhighway,
DURHAM (N.C.) HERALD-SUN, Feb. 8, 1995, at C7 (noting that over "70 daily U.S.
newspapers now have active on-line systems or have announced they soon will have"
and discussing the introduction of the AP-Gannett Personalized Information service,
which "enables newspapers to offer readers a personalized news-on-demand service");
Knight-Ridder and Advance Publications Announce Joint Venture, Feb. 1, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, US File (discussing the collaboration between newspaper
conglomerates Knight-Ridder and Advance Publications to develop content for the
Internet, available first on the World Wide Web);Jay Mathews, Writers Sue on Story
Use by Data Services, WASH. POST., Dec. 17, 1993, at C3 ("[In 1992 more than 3,000
print publications, including most major newspapers and magazines, were carried on
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publishing industry1 and the Library of Congress22 plan to follow
this trend.
2. CD-ROM
Unlike online services that give a computer user remote access
to the database of an information provider, CD-ROM systems
provide the user with a full copy of the information itself.23 Each
electronic databases."); Michael Putzel, A Personal Journal from Dow Jones, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 19 (describing the electronic version of the Wall StreetJournal,
called the "PersonalJournal," that electronically provides a subscriber with daily news
customized to her specifications).
Recently, when workers of the San Francisco Chronicle and the San Francisco
Examiner went on strike, the striking employees and management each published an
online newspaper in lieu of the printed versions. See Alice Z. Cuneo, San Francisco's
Newspaper Strike Spurs Online Action, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 14, 1994, at 8 (noting
that each day 25,000 readers accessed the labor newspaper, and 20,000 accessed the
management newspaper); Hacks or Hackers?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1994, at 78
(observing that on its first day of operation, the union's electronic newspaper was
read by 37,000 people).
21 See Susan Moran, Authors Seek Higher Royalties on Electronic Rights, Reuters Eur.
Bus. Rep., Apr. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reueub File ("Most big
publishing houses, faced with slow growth from their traditional book businesses,
have mapped out plans to expand electronic publishing and distribution."); Calvin
Reid, NWU Paper Addresses Online Concerns, PUBLISHERS WKLY., Oct. 10, 1994, at 8,
9 (noting that there exist at least a half-dozen online book publishers); see also Mary
L. Mills, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argumentfor Finding
Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 307, 308 n.5 (1989) (suggesting that electronic books may eventually
replace printed books).
' The Library of Congress plans to "create a vast 'virtual library' of digitized
images of books, drawings, manuscripts and photographs that would lookjust like the
originals and could be sent over computer networks to computer screens and high-
definition television sets, accessible to millions of students and researchers." Peter
H. Lewis, Library of Congress Offers to Feed the Data Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1994, at B11;see also Olin Chism, Electronic Superlibraty in the Cards, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Sept. 18, 1994, atJ8 (discussing the current extent of online services provided
by the Library of Congress).
A substantial portion of the Library of Congress's 104-million-item collection is
covered by copyrights. See Lewis, supra, at Bll. The digitization of any of these
items presents the same dilemma as with other media. See Library of Congress Proposes
Nation's Digital Library, COMMON CARRIER WK., Sept. 19, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, ZTL1 File (discussing copyright issues caused by digitizing copyrighted
materials); VirtualNationalLibray: Library of Congress Proposes Nation"s DigitalLibrary,
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1 (noting that the Library of Congress's project
requires a "[c]omprehensive plan dealing with copyright issues"). Assuming that
some royalties are paid by the Library of Congress for access to this material, the
fundamental question is whether these royalties are to be paid to the publishers or
to the authors.23 See TONY HENDLEY, CD-ROM AND OPTICAL PUBLISHING SYSTEMS 47 (1987).
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CD-ROM disc can digitally store 600 million characters of text, 250
thousand typewritten pages, or one nine-volume encyclopedia.
24
Because of their large storage capacity and relatively low cost of
production, 25 compact discs allow computer users access to
tremendous amounts of information.
Compact discs, invented in 1980, were launched commercially
in 1983 to store music.26 CD-ROMs are used to store digital data
accessible by computer rather than by compact-disc player,27 and
were introduced commercially for this purpose in 1985.28 In 1994,
the number of CD-ROM players grew to 26.9 million units world-
wide.29  The number of consumer titles for CD-ROM software
doubled in 1994, and is expected to double again in 1995.30 The
publishing industry has begun to take advantage of the CD-ROM
medium as a complementary means for distributing its products.
1
Newspapers intend to begin exploiting the CD-ROM medium as
well. 2
B. The Current Battle over Distribution Rights in New Media
These new media are the battleground for freelance writers and
publishers, with each group seeking the rights to use existing works
on the new media."3 Although publishers ordinarily have the
The CD-ROM format maybe less suitable for the newspaper and magazine industries
because the data in online systems can be supplemented with little or no turnaround
time, thereby maintaining the currency of the database, whereas up-to-date CD-ROMs
must first be manufactured and distributed. See id.
24 See Jean-Loup Tournier, Authors' Rights and New Modes of Exploitation, 16
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 441, 442 (1992). Each disc stores 550 megabytes of
information. See HENDLEY, supra note 23, at 16.
2 See HENDLEY, supra note 23, at 6 (comparing CD-ROMs with other computer
storage technologies); see also Steve Alexander, Computing in Las Vegas, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis),Jan. 5, 1995, at ID (noting that each CD-ROM costs about one dollar
to manufacture).26 See HENDLEY, supra note 23, at 12.
' See id. at 13-18 (comparing the CD-ROM and audio-compact-disc formats).
28 See id. at 9.
2' See CD-ROM Readers Now Number 26.9 Million, Reuters,Jan. 12, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
See id.
"See, e.g., Grant Buckler, Playboy Castro CD-ROM Interview Sparks "Piracy" Dispute,
Newsbytes News Network, Apr. 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File (discussingPlayboy's use of CD-ROM to distribute previously published articles).
.2 See Glaberson, supra note 20, at D1 (explaining that the New York Times intends
to develop new media, including CD-ROM). But see supra note 23 (discussing the
inherent limitations of the CD-ROM format for newspapers).
" See infra text accompanying notes 41-43 (discussing the conflict between writers
1995)
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rights to use preexisting content produced by their staff writers
under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, 4 the usage of works by
freelancers is subject solely to interpretation of the underlying
contract between the two parties.35 Historically, however, parties
have been lax in creating written,"
6 let alone unambiguous, 37
contracts. Until recently, magazines and newspapers bought articles
"simply on the basis of oral agreements,"3 8 and the freelance
contracts that did exist did not expressly address the parties' rights
in electronic media. 9 Courts must decide, then, whether these
agreements conveyed more than the right for the newspaper to
print the work once.
40
and publishers).
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining a "work made for hire" as, in part, "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"); MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw § 5.2[A]-[B] (1989) (describing the work-
made-for-hire doctrine and explaining that the employer is granted all rights unless
a written agreement between the employer and employee explicitly states otherwise).
A work made for hire may also be "a work.., commissioned for use as a contribu-
tion to a collective work.., if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire." 17 U.S.C.
§ 101. As an example of a collective work, § 101 offers "a periodical issue." Id.; see
also LEAFFER, supra, § 5.2[B] (explaining that the writing conferring a made-for-hire
status on a work "must be signed by both parties, and ... must consist of explicit
wording that the work be considered a work made for hire").
o The contract between the parties may convey the copyright in whatever manner
the parties choose. See ROBERTA. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAw 52-53 (1991) (discussing
copyright assignments and licenses). Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976
(1976 Act) provides that "ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or
in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed
by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession."
17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1988).
s See Don E. Tomlinson & Christopher R. Harris, Free-Lance Photojournalism in a
Digital World: Copyrigh4 Lanham Act & Droit Moral Considerations Plus a Sui Generis
Solution, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 23 (1992) (noting that in the photojournalism trade
"[c]ommitments [are] made without written purchase orders [and] obligations are
fulfilled on the basis of a telephone call or handshake" (quoting CLIFTON C. EDOM,
PHOTOJOURNALISM PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 255 (2d ed. 1980))); Douglas Steinberg,
NoteJournalists'Rights to Their Own Work, 8 ART & L. 113, 120-21 (1983) (discussing
the history of oral contracting in journalism); Carmody, supra note 5, at B20 (noting
that "[b]efore the days of electronic publishing, many magazines bought articles
simply on the basis of oral contracts").
7 See Resnick, supra note 4, at 28 (explaining that "many publishers still rely on
old contracts with outdated language that fail to cover issues raised by the new
electronic media").
"o Carmody, supra note 5, at B20.
39 See id.
40 Freelance contracts for journalists generally gave publishers "first North
American serial rights," which granted the publication the exclusive right to publish
the piece first. Id.; see also Guy, supra note 20, at 8B (noting the contention of the
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The courts' first look at this issue will occur in Tasini v. New York
Times.41 In Tasini, ten freelance writers filed a suit against five
companies: The New York Times Co. and Times Mirror Co., both
newspaper publishers; Time Warner, a magazine publisher; Mead
Data Central, then owners of the LEXIS/NEXIS database services;
National Writers Union that the rights of freelance authors "are being infringed as
their work is placed on electronic databases and CD-ROMs without their consent or
[any] payment"); Hanna Liebman, National Writers Union Suit Seeks Clarification on
Freelancers' Rights, MEDIAWEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 4 ("At issue are the rights to stories
when such are not spelled out in written contracts.").
The interpretation of copyright assignments for content published as part of a
collective work differs somewhat from that of other types of assignments. Section
201(c) of the 1976 Act provides:
In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under
it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution
as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 20 1(c) (1988); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B], at 10-87 to 10-97 (1994) (discussing § 201(c) in the context
of licenses).
On its face, the statute suggests that freelance writers and photographers for
magazines and newspapers who did not sign contracts are presumed to have granted
only first North American serial rights, rendering the discussion moot as tojournalists
and photographers, but not book authors. See infra notes 55-56 (noting that
nonexclusive licenses may be granted orally). But see 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra,
§ 10.10[B] n.6 (observing that it is unclear whether the writing requirement of
§ 201(c) of the 1976 Act applies to transfers effected before that law took effect on
January 1, 1978). Although the issue appears to be unlitigated, it could be argued
that the computer database should be viewed as a "revision of" or a "later collective
work in the same series" as the original periodical. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). The basis for
this argument is that to qualify for a separate copyright as a collective work, the
electronic compilation would have to have a distinguishable, nontrivial variation from
the underlying compilation (that being the printed newspaper or magazine). See e.g.,
L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that changing
the medium of a work is in itself insufficient to warrant recognition of a new
copyright); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)
("All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author'
contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably
'his own.'" (quoting Chamberlain v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir.
1945))). If the later, or electronic, collective work is not separately copyrightable
from the earlier, or printed, compilation, then the electronic compilation should be
considered "a revision" of the printed compilation. Cf. L Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at
491; Secure Servs. Technology v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1354,
1363 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding that the rearranging of binary digits in a computer
protocol is too minimal a change to recognize as a derivative or collective work).
4' 93-Civ.-8678 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 1993); see Martin Garbus, Who Owns
Electronic Rights in the New Media?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 23, 1994, at 1; Matthew Goldstein,
New Copyright Claims Raised in Suits Against Online Providers, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 30, 1994,
at 5.
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and University Microfilms, an issuer of CD-ROMs of periodicals.
2
The writers claim that their work was republished on online
computer databases and CD-ROMs without their consent.
43
On one side of this dispute are the freelance authors. They
consider themselves to be "modernday sweatshop workers" who
scrape a living with low salaries and no benefits." They believe
that they are entitled to the rights to their works on new media,
which would enable them to license the works to the original
publisher, if they choose, for reissuance on the electronic media.
On the other side are the publishers, who claim that they were
granted the rights to use the works when those works were
originally conveyed. The publishers deny that electronic rights, or
any rights to use a work on a future technology or new medium,
must be granted explicitly and separately.4' Despite their differ-
ences, both sides agree on one point: this issue "will have wide-
ranging consequences for the publishing industry no matter which
side prevails."
46
II. A CENTURY OF CONFUSED COMMON LAW: A HISTORICAL
EXAMINATION OF NEW-USE ASSIGNMENTS
Over the past century, courts have struggled to develop a
common law to interpret, in the absence of explicit contractual
provisions, copyright licensing or assignment agreements following
the arrival of an unforeseen new medium of expression.4 7 Histori-
4
1 See Goldstein, supra note 41, at 5; see also Resnick, supra note 4, at 28 (noting
that the Tasini plaintiffs seek damages as well); Writers Sue Publishers over Articles in
Databases, WALL ST.J., Dec. 17, 1993, at B6 (stating that the Tasini plaintiffs charged
copyright infringement and asked for a permanent injunction to prevent the
continuance of the alleged infringement). Tasini promises to be the first suit to
examine, on the merits, copyright assignments of future technologies in the
traditional publishing media. A similar suit has since settled, and resulted in a
payment by the publisher to the creator. See Bruce Hartford, Ensuring Cyberspace
Copyrights, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 27, 1994, at C5; Playboy Settles with Author, NWU in
E-Rights Dispute, PUBLISHER'S WKLY, July 4, 1994, at 14 [hereinafter Playboy Settles].
In that suit, a freelance author sued Playboy for distributing on CD-ROM his 1967
interview with Fidel Castro. See Buckler, supra note 31. The rights to the CD-ROM
distribution were unclear because the 1967 contract preceded the advent of optical
computer-disc technology. See id.; Hartford, supra, at C5.41 See Goldstein, supra note 41, at 5; Resnick, supra note 4, at 28.
14 Mary Voboril, Writes and Wrongs: Freelancers Are Struggling Against Low Pay,
Deadbeat Publishers and Ownership of Electric Rights, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 21, 1994, at
23 (quotingJonathan Tasini, president of the National Writers Union).
' See Resnick, supra note 4, at 28.
46 Id.
47 The earliest reported cases address the interpretations of assignments of plays
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cally, these new media have included silent motion pictures,48
talking motion pictures, 49  television,5" and videocassettes. 5'
in the wake of motion picture development. See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S.
317,327 (1920) (grantingan injunction against the representation of a playin moving
pictures); Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (finding an implied
negative covenant that prevented both the grantor and the grantee of a copyright in
a play from representing the play in motion pictures); Lipzin v. Gordin, 166 N.Y.S.
792, 792 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (holding that an exclusive license to produce a play carried
with it the right to produce a motion picture as well); Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S.
633, 634 (App. Div. 1914) (finding that a grant of rights to a play did not permit its
production as a motion picture because neither party contemplated such rights when
the agreement was made).
48 See supra note 47.
49 See, e.g., Murphy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 112 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1940)
(holding that a transfer of motion-picture rights in a copyrighted play includes the
right to produce talking motion pictures); L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d
196, 199 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding that exclusive moving-picture rights granted by an
author in her book included the rights to produce talking motion pictures, although
the latter medium was unknown at the time the agreement was executed); Macloon
v. Vitagraph, Inc., 30 F.2d 634, 635 (2d Cir. 1929) (holding that the stage rights to a
play include the rights to produce a motion picture of the play); G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 92 F. Supp. 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (holding that
exclusive dramatic rights to an opera included the right of dramatization in motion-
picture form); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165 (N.Y.
1933) (holding that a right to profits in a play encompassed a right in the same share
of profits from production of the play as a talking motion picture); Cinema Corp. of
America v. De Mille, 267 N.Y.S. 327, 327 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (concluding that an author
who by his own conduct had divested himself of all property in a story had also
transferred talking motion picture rights, although talking motion pictures were
unknown when the agreement was executed).
I See, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150,155 (2d Cir. 1968)
(holding that an assignment of the rights to exhibit motion pictures of a copyrighted
play included the right to televise the motion picture); Ettore v. Philco Television
Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481,487 (3d Cir. 1956) (finding television stations liable
for damages for broadcasting an old motion picture of a prizefight without the
consent of one of the fighters); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp.
725,727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the reservation of television rights in a transfer
agreement operated to prohibit the exhibition of a motion picture on television);
Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450,452 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that a copyright holder's sole and exclusive grant to a film corporation to
use a book included the right to broadcast the motion picture version of the book on
television).
51 See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248,
1993 WL 39269, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (finding that the uncontracted-for
videotape distribution of a movie infringed the licensor's copyright), vacated in part
on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d
1379, 1387 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a grant of "television viewing" rights to 104
film episodes of Curious George did not encompass the right to distribute the films in
videocassette form); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp.
153, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concluding that it was a question for the jury whether a
grant of all rights in copyrighted songs included the right to publish these songs on
videocassette, a form unknown at the time the contract was written); Brown v.
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Each arrival created a new property right, namely the right to
display the copyrighted work in the new medium,5 2 and forced
courts to grapple with whether licenses for these new media were
granted along with those for the preexisting media.5"
Together, these cases establish a common law for contract
construction that transcends the contractual language of each
case." A coherent common law is necessary because, without
mention of future uses in the contracts themselves,5 5 or without
written contracts at all,56 courts are confronted with fundamentally
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 171-72 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
that an agreement between a musical entertainer and a television producer that
allowed the reproduction of the entertainer's performance on a television show em-
braced reproduction of the performance on film, videocassette, and videodisc as well);
Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.NJ. 1983) (holding
that an agreement allowing the use of copyrighted songs in a motion picture also per-
mitted their use on a videocassette of the motion picture because the language of the
agreement included the right to use "any means or methods now or hereafter known"
for reproduction); Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that a contract between an actor and a motion-picture
company allowing the company to distribute and exhibit certain movies embraced the
right to use these films in alternative markets such as the commercial television, pay
television, and audiovisual device markets without further compensation to the actor);
Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that a
licensing agreement granting rights to distribute certain motion pictures "for broad-
casting on television or any other similar device not known or hereafter made known"
did not encompass videocassette and videodisc rights to these motion pictures).
5 See, e.g., Harper Bros. v. KIaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (concluding that
motion-picture rights "are an accretion or unearned increment conferred of late years
upon the copyright owners by the ingenuity of many inventors and mechanicians").
53 See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-87 to 10-91 (citing
new-use cases); supra notes 49-51 (same); infra part II (analyzing new-use cases).
5 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.11 (1990)
(stating that rules of construction, as opposed to rules of interpretation, "help to
determine the legal effect of language quite independently of the meaning that the
parties may have attached to it"); Alan J. Hartnick, A Look at Grant of Rights'
Provisions, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 10, 1993, at 5 (noting that "construction... [of a copyright
license] goes beyond the written agreement").
" Although exclusive licenses must be in writing, there "is no prescribed form for
the writing transferring copyright except that it be signed by the copyright owner."
LEAFFER, supra note 34, § 5.11[A]. As a result of the informality allowed, new-use
issues are often unaddressed in the contract. See id. § 5.10 (noting that sometimes
"parties fail to take into account a new medium").
' Under the 1976 Act, nonexclusive licenses need not be in writing. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 204(a); see also LEAFFER, supra note 34, § 5.11[A] (noting that "nonexclusive
licenses ... may be transferred orally"). The publishing industry is particularly
notorious for its aversion to written contracts. See supra note 36 (discussing the
history of oral and informal contracting practices of publishers).
Throughout this Comment, new-use rights are discussed as belonging either to
the creator-licensor or the publisher-licensee. Although such language describes
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similar questions independent of individual contracts. With the
exception of several early cases,57 courts have taken a generally
consistent approach to this process of contract interpretation."
Courts will first attempt to gauge the parties' intents; if unable to
assess those intents, courts will examine substantive and procedural
unconscionability. If the agreement is not unconscionable in either
manner, courts will determine whether the medium was relatively
foreseeable. If the medium is foreseeable, the grantee is entitled to
use of the new medium; if not foreseeable, the right is vested in the
grantor. In order to provide a better understanding of the
historical construction of these agreements, the remainder of this
Part will scrutinize the steps that courts typically follow in each
phase of the analysis.59
exclusive assignments per se, it also applies to the nonexclusive licenses likely to be
inferred from oral contracts. In either case the issue is whether the plaintiff-creator
conveyed certain new-use rights to the defendant-licensee. The economic prefera-
bility of nonexclusive licenses (in which both the licensor and the licensee could
exploit the new use) to exclusive licenses (which grant rights solely to the licensee) is
an empirical issue beyond the scope of this Comment. Because all case law to date
has involved disputed exclusive licenses, that terminology is used throughout this
Comment.
s The first courts considering the issue often enjoined both parties, the author-
licensor and producer-licensee, from takingadvantage of the new medium of motion
pictures. See Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 327 (1920); Harper Bros. v. Klaw,
232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). Rather than granting rights to the new medium to
one or both of the parties, courts required the parties to bargain for the new rights.
See id. at 613 ("[A]s long as the contract... exists, neither party thereto can produce
a photo-play of Ben Hur except by bargain with the other.").
Since then, courts have adopted the policy of favoring, rather than frustrating,
transitions into new media by vesting ownership of the new use in one party. See
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating a
preference for granting the licensee the rights to the new use rather than "risk...
a deadlock between the grantor and grantee [that] might prevent the work's being
shown over the new medium at all"); Madoon v. Vitagraph, Inc., 30 F.2d 634,636 (2d
Cir. 1929) ("The law always favors the free and unrestricted use of property, and
doubts and ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the natural right to such free
use and enjoyment, and against restrictions thereof.").
" Although some commentators recognize that the case law as a whole is not fully
cohesive, see, e.g., Neil R. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and the New Video
Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REv. 1160, 1176 (1982) (asserting that the "application
of contract construction rationales has been a superficial and tenuous one"),
variations in treatment by the courts can be traced to the perceived differences
between the new and old media and to the stage of development of the new medium
at the time of contract. At times, however, these distinctions can be "superficial and
tenuous." Id.; see also infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (examining courts'
inconsistent comparisons of new media with old).
'9 This step-by-step framework will explore the factors important to courts
considering new-use issues. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1387-88 (1st Cir.
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A. The Search for Intent Is Usually in Vain
The most, and perhaps only, straightforward way to infer intent
is to examine the explicit terms of the contract itself. Short of an
assignment granting all rights to a work,6" the implementation of
a future technology clause, which specifies that the grantee reserves
rights to use all future media, is the only way to guarantee the
intended transfer of rights.6 Yet, given that parties do not know
at the time of contract what types of new uses will develop, interpre-
tive problems will ensue unless the grantor divests herself of all new
uses.62 The nature of new uses, however, generally defies an
1993); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-91 to 10-95
(describing the approaches taken by courts in analyzing the uses to which a license
applies); Nagano, supra note 58, at 1163-83 (analyzing past approaches to the new-use
cases).
o See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 169
(D.D.C. 1992) (noting that the agreement at issue granted rights of reproduction,
exhibition, and transmission "in and by all media and means whatsoever" (quoting the
agreement between the parties)); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F.
Supp. 226, 227 (D.NJ. 1983) (noting that the parties licensed the rights "to exhibit,
exploit, market and perform [American Graffitil perpetually throughout the world by
any means or methods now or hereafter known" (alteration in original) (quoting the
agreement between the parties)).
61 Parties' courses of conduct following the closing of the contract may also shed
light on those parties' intent. See, e.g., Platinum Record Co., 566 F. Supp. at 227
(finding that, because the grantor "has registered no objections in the past to the
repeated showing of Ameiican Graffiti on cable and over-the-air television," he cannot
claim that the granted rights extended only to theatrical exhibitions); Filmvideo
Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725,728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (suggesting that
the licensee's effort to obtain television rights estopped him from claiming that he
already possessed those rights). Such courses of conduct, however, are not
dispositive. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481,483 n.4
(3d Cir. 1956) (taking notice of the licensor's initial failure to deny that he had
granted television rights in conjunction with the motion picture rights granted, but
looking beyond that intent to unconscionability).
6 These issues will frequently arise because, even if the parties recognize that
unknown future technologies may exist, grantors may be reluctant to grant all new
uses not knowing what they are giving up. Likewise, grantees may not wish to pay
more for speculative new uses for which they, for a number of reasons, may not be
able to exploit fully. Accordingly, parties may prefer to draw analogies between
preexisting uses and new uses or to define distinctions between different types of new
uses. In either case, interpretive difficulties will ensue.
In such a scenario, for example, a contract might state that the grantee may use
the work by means of "television and by any other technological, mechanical or
electronic means, method or device now known or hereafter conceived or created."
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 WL 39269,
at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (quoting the "future technology" clause of the copyright
agreement between the parties), vacated inpart on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir.
1994) (en banc). The question then arises as to whether videocassette rights are
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examination of intent.63 Because new uses naturally arise after the
assignment, and because of the length of time that can transpire
between the initial assignment and the infringement on the new
medium, intent regarding the assignment of rights in the medium
not yet created will seldom, if ever, be found.'
B. The Emergence of New Uses May Render the Original
Contract Unconscionable
Once a determination of intent is found insufficient for
resolving whether a grantor has granted rights involving the new
medium, a court next considers issues of unconscionability.
Substantive unconscionability, as opposed to procedural unconscio-
nability,65 examines whether the contract, on its face, is unfair to
included within television rights. See id. This raises the same issue, therefore, as
when no future technology clause exists, as courts attempt to squeeze the new
medium within the definition of the old. See infra text accompanying notes 78-84
(discussing the approach of analyzing the ambiguous penumbra of contractual terms).
63 See Rey, 990 F.2d at 1387 ("Such absence of specific intent typifies cases which
address 'new uses' of licensed materials. .. ."); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40,
§ 10.10[B], at 10-91 (noting that searching for the parties' intent is problematic
because in all likelihood "there simply was no intent at all at the time of execution
with respect to this issue insofar as it relates to whether the grant includes a new use
developed at a later time").
" See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-91 to 10-92 ("The very
fact that we are most often dealing with a later developed technological process (even
if it were known of in some form at the time of execution) suggests that the parties'
ambiguous phraseology masks an absence ofintent rather than a hidden intent which
the court simply must 'find.'"); see also Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 391 F.2d
150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968) ("With Bartsch dead, his grantors apparently so, and the
Warner Brothers lawyer understandably having no recollection of the negotiation, any
effort to reconstruct what the parties actually intended nearly forty years ago is
doomed to failure.").
65 Procedural unconscionability arises from gross differences in the sophistication
between the parties to contract, see 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 54, § 4.28, at 506-08
(explaining that although adhesion is generally not enough to trigger the doctrine of
procedural unconscionability, sometimes the deceptiveness of the contractual
language and procedures used to secure the contract, as well as the inequality of
bargaining power between two parties, may be enough to find unconscionability),
such as between a prizefighter and a television network. In Norman v. Century
Athletic Club, Inc., 69 A.2d 466 (Md. 1949), the court applied an unusually narrow
definition of the word "broadcast," allowing the plaintiff-boxer to retain television,
but not radio, rights. See id. at 468. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp.,
229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), dealt with a prizefighter who licensed his film rights to
his bout withJoe Louis. See id. at 483. NBC later broadcast the film on its television
series Greatest Fights of the Centuy. See id. The boxer's initial reaction, evidencing his
lack of sophistication, was not of dismay over the infringing use, but of dissatisfaction
with the way in which the film was edited for television. See id. Looking for an
analogous context, the court acknowledged that a seller of land could not, years later,
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either party." If the court determines that one interpretation of
the contract would render it unconscionable, the court interprets
the contract to avoid such an unconscionable construction. 7 In the
new-use setting, this doctrine is used when a new medium sup-
plants, rather than supplements, the old one.6 1 Substantive uncon-
scionability has been applied, even if not by name,69 in cases
involving the transition from plays to motion pictures7 0 and from
silent motion pictures to talking motion pictures. 7' For this reason
following a successful housing development, rescind the contract of sale or ask for
additional compensation. See id. at 488. The court, however, ignored its analogy and
justified its decision to vest the television rights in the boxer on the grounds of
"fairness." Id. at 490. Courts have not found procedural unconscionability in the
bargaining relationships between authors and publishers, or between playwrights and
studios.
6 See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 54, § 4.28, at 506 (defining substantive uncon-
scionability as the inclusion of contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to one
party).6 7 see, e.g., Ettore, 229 F.2d at 490-91 (interpreting the agreement between the
parties as fairness requires); see also infra notes 70-71 (providing examples of
substantive unconscionability).
6 See Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S. 633, 634 (App. Div. 1914) ("That by the aid of
science it has, since the contract was executed, been made possible to produce the
play in some manner not then contemplated, does not give [the grantor or the
grantor's estate] the right to destroy [the grantee's] property.... ."); see also Kirke La
Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167-68 (N.Y. 1933) (discussing
Frohman).
6 See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 167 (implying substantive unconscio-
nability in the similar doctrine of good faith and fair dealing).
" See, e.g., Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (holding that the
licensor could not exploit the new motion-picture medium to the "detriment, if not
destruction, of the licensees' estate"); see also Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 167
(preventing one party from "destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract").
71 See L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding
that "'talkies' ... are employed by the same theaters [and] enjoyed by the same
audiences").
The court in Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993), provided an
illuminating analysis of the substantive unconscionability issue:
The problem [with contract interpretation] becomes particularly acute when
the analogous [new] technology develops so rapidly as to supplant the origi-
nally contemplated application of the licensed work, rendering the parties'
original bargain obsolete. Thus, for example, broad grants of "motion
picture rights," made before technological advances permitted the
combination of moving images with sound, later were held, typically, to
encompass the rights to sound motion picture technology; a narrower
holding would have left the original license virtually worthless, despite its
broad language, and would have provided the licensor with an undeserved
windfall.
Id. at 1388-89 n.7.
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color television rights are inferred from preexisting black-and-white
rights,72 and videodisc rights are likely to be inferred from video-
cassette rights.
C. Foreseeing the New Technology: The Courts'
Yardstick for Fairness
If intent cannot be surmised, and there is no unconscionability,
courts look to equitable policy grounds to determine whether it
would be fair to grant the new-use rights to the licensee along with
the preexisting rights.7" In determining whether the new tech-
nology falls within the scope of the explicitly granted or preexisting
technology, courts examine the foreseeability of the new medi-
um.7  If the technology was wholly unforeseeable-if the new
medium had not yet been invented-rights are retained by the
grantor.7" But if the technology was invented, though not com-
mercialized, the rights are granted along with those for the
preexisting medium.7" This boundary between the foreseeable and
the unforeseeable is a guiding principle for modern courts.77
72 Judging from the lack of case law contesting the new use of color television, it
is reasonable to infer that existing television rights must have undisputedly
encompassed future color rights.
73See Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (describing methods of interpretation and their
underlying policy rationales).
11 Compare Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1968)
(reading the grant at issue to include television rights because at the time of the
contract between the parties in 1930, "the future possibilities of television were
recognized by knowledgeable people in the entertainment and motion picture
industries") with Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir.
1988) (refusing to enlarge the grant in the parties' contract to include videocassette
distribution rights because "VCRs for home use were not invented or known in 1969,
when the license was executed").
7' See, e.g., Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (precluding the implied grant of new uses "that
had not been introduced to the domestic market at the time the parties entered into
the agreement").
7 See, e.g., Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (distinguishing the case at hand from those in
which the new medium had not been invented, and hence was "completely unknown
at the time when the contract was written").
" See, e.g., Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (recognizing different interpretive methods
depending on whether the medium had been invented at the time of the grant);
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that under New York law, different policies are followed depending
on whether the parties "could not know of the invention's existence" or instead failed
to foresee the medium's potential (quoting Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154)).
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1. The Bartsch Approach: Contracts Granting Rights to
Use Technologies Already Created, but Not Widely
Commercialized, at the Time of the Contract
The first method, labeled as preferred by Nimmer,7 8 and
embraced by Judge Friendly in Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 7 holds that "the licensee may properly pursue any uses which
may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the
license."8" The Bartsch court noted that this right includes uses
within the "ambiguous penumbra" of the terms of the contract."
"In other words, the question before [a] court is not whether [the
licensee] gave the words the right meaning, but whether or not the
words authorized the meaning he [now] gives them." 2 According-
ly, a court applying the Bartsch approach would determine, for
example, whether television rights fall within the motion picture
rights explicitly granted,"3 or whether videocassette rights similarly
fall within television rights.8 4 Although the Bartsch court granted
See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-92 to 10-93 (noting
that this alternative "is believed to be preferred ... in part because the courts are
equipped to determine the outerlimits of the reasonable meaning of a term... [and]
because it is less likely to prove unjust").
79 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
o Id. at 155 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 125.3
(1964)).
81 Id. (quoting NIMMER, supra note 80, § 125.3).
8 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-93 (citation omitted).
" See, e.g., Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 153 (examining whether "a broad assignment of the
right 'to... license and exhibit.., motion picture photoplays.. .' includes the right
to 'license' a broadcaster to 'exhibit' the copyrighted motion picture by a telecast
without a further grant by the copyright owner" (quoting the contract between the
parties)); Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (mem.) ("[O]ne does not have to roam far into the penumbral
meanings of 'motion picture versions' to conclude that the term was intended by the
parties to embrace rather than exclude the right to produce a television series.").
" See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1390 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
television rights did not encompass videocassette distribution rights); Subafilms, Ltd.
v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 WL 39269, at *4 (9th Cir.
Feb. 17, 1993) (finding that a future technology clause did not encompass the home
video market), vacated in part on other grounds, 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
television rights did not include rights to distribution of videocassettes for home
viewing); Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226,227 (D.N.J. 1983)
(finding that the "absence of any specific mention" of videocassette rights is
"insignificant" in the determination of foreseeability); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570
N.Y.S.2d 521,525 (App. Div. 1991) (finding television rights and videocassette rights
"so dissimilar" as to preclude the conclusion that they both fall within the agreement
at issue).
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rights to new uses when the parties "had reason to know of the new
medium's potential,""5 some courts subsequently have relaxed the
level of foreseeability required for licensees to receive a grant of
new-use rights. 6
The weakness of this analysis is that it enables courts to play
with the definitions of each medium and manipulate the compari-
son. For example, courts have reached different conclusions as to
whether television is analogous to cinematography 7 and as to
whether videocassettes are analogous to television." These
85 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154. The foreseeability of the new medium in Bartsch was
used to distinguish the facts of that case from those of Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165 (N.Y. 1933), in which the parties disagreed as to
whether the assignment conferred rights to the not-yet-invented medium of talking
motion pictures. See Barsch, 391 F.2d at 154.
1 See, e.g., Re, 990 F.2d at 1388 (noting that a relaxed standard allows "the courts
[to] presume that at least the possibility of nonspecific 'new uses' was foreseeable by
the contracting parties at the time the licensing agreement was drafted"); ABKCO
Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(granting videocassette rights to the licensee from the 1966 contract, despite the fact
that videocassettes were not invented until the early 1970s, because the parties to the
contract were sophisticated). When the foreseeability requirement is stretched to
allow nonspecific foreseeability (as in Rey) or constructive foreseeability (as in
ABKCO), the distinction between the foreseeable and the unforeseeable becomes
arbitrary. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99 (explaining the nonsensical nature
of such a distinction).
' Although they both ultimately reached the same result, the district and appellate
courts in Bartsch disagreed on whether television is sufficiently analogous to
cinematography. The district court found such an analogy:
The processes of theatre and home television exhibition are markedly
similar.... The process of 'unscrambling' or 'descanning' the airwave
transmission so as to cast the image on the television screen is quite similar
to that which takes place on the theatre screen, except that on the set in the
home an electronic shutter, rather than a mechanical shutter, is used to
control the picture image.
Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 896, 900-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The
court of appeals, however, saw it differently:
[T]o characterize the.., miraculous processes whereby these images actuate
airwaves so as to cause electronic changes in sets in millions of homes which
are then 'unscrambled' or 'descanned' and thus produce pictures on
television screens-along with the simultaneous electronic transmission of
sound-as 'analogous' to cinematography pushes the analogy beyond the
breaking point.
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 153.
' Compare Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 538 F. Supp. 211, 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("[T]here is little basis for [a] distinction between immediate exhibition of the
film by television and the sale of videocassettes for home exhibition.... [W]hether
the exhibition apparatus is a home videocassette player or a television station's
broadcast transmitter, the films are 'exhibited' as images on home television
screens.") with Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851,854 (9th Cir. 1988)
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inconsistencies are to be expected because of the complexity of the
comparison: an observer might regard either the projection
technology or the means of distributing the work as the salient
characteristic for comparison. Most courts, however, have com-
pared the distribution methods of the two media to determine
foreseeability 
8 9
Bartsch's strength is that it encourages the use of new media by
expanding the definition of the originally licensed medium to
include those new media within its vague linguistic penumbra.
9 0
The Bartsch court explicitly acknowledged this underlying policy,
noting that an expansive reading of the terms of the contract
provides a single person who can make the copyrighted work
available to the public over the penumbral medium, whereas [a]
narrower [interpretation of the words of the contract] involves the
risk that a deadlock between the grantor and the grantee might
prevent the work's being shown over the new medium at all."'
Because new media are designed to improve the quality or facilitate
the flow of information in society, efforts to encourage their
development are in the public interest.
92
("Television and videocassette display ... have very little in common besides the fact
that a conventional monitor of a television set maybe used both to receive television
signals and to exhibit a videocassette.").
"' See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853 (concluding that the grant of television rights
"contemplates some sort of broadcasting or centralized distribution, not distribution
by sale or rental of individual copies to the general public"); see also Manners v.
Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 326-27 (1920) (distinguishing motion pictures from plays on
the basis of their means of distribution); Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting
Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 488 (1956) (finding that broadcasting, "the interposition of
electrical impulses which carry the picture to receiving sets," is a factor that
distinguishes motion pictures from television); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570
N.Y.S.2d 521, 524 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting Cohen). But see Norman v. Century
Athletic Club, 69 A.2d 466, 470 (Md. 1949) (defining "broadcast" rights as including
rights to transmit via radio, but not via television).
It should also be noted that if the manner of distribution is not affected by the
new medium, it is likely that the new, and presumably improved, technology will
supplant the old technology, triggering an unconscionability analysis. See supra notes
66-72 and accompanying text.
90 See LEAFFER, supra note 34, § 5.10 ("[T]he broader definition supports diffusion
of copyrighted works, allowing the person in the best position to distribute the work
in the new media to do so.").
91 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
" See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the prevailing belief that
increased public access to information distributed on new media benefits society).
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2. The Cohen Approach: Contracts Retaining Rights to Future
Technologies Not Yet Created at the Time of the Contract
When the new medium does not exist at all at the time of
contract, courts have been unwilling to grant licensees the windfall
of the rights to use the work in the new medium.9" This approach,
first adopted by New York's highest court in Kirke La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co.,94 and later followed by the Ninth Circuit in
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,95 is based on an equitable
concern that although it may be reasonable to hold the grantor to
the court's interpretation of the language of the contract when the
new medium was foreseeable, it is not fair to do so when the
medium was "completely unforeseeable and therefore could not
possibly have formed part of the bargain between the parties at the
time of the original grant."96
Although this distinction is meant to "prevent licensees from
'reap[ing] the entire windfall' associated with the new medium,"97
it is grounded in fundamentally flawed logic. First, new-use issues
arise precisely because parties did not contemplate future technolo-
gies and therefore formed no intent with respect to them.98 It is
therefore nonsensical to use one analysis where the technology was
possibly foreseeable, and another where it was unforeseeable,
"' See, e.g., Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (asserting that the "holder of the license should
not now 'reap the entire windfall' associated with the new medium" (citation
omitted)); Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., 1992 WL 170686, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 1,
1992) ("Under New York law, if the disputed use [by the licensee] was not invented
when the parties signed their agreement, that use is not permitted under the
contract"), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Nagano, supra
note 58, at 1185 (calling for "judicial balancing of the parties' equities" to resolve and
allocate "potential windfall benefits").
188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
95 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
9 Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis omitted); see also
Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (noting that the licensee could not have bargained for rights
of videocassette reproduction before the invention of the videocassette recorder);
Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 165-66 (finding that the rights to make a motion
picture with sound were not transferred by the agreement because the "talkie"
technology to make motion pictures with sound was not yet invented at the time of
the contract).
9" Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854).
" See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying this contractual construction based on foreseeability
"[w]here such general intent cannot be discerned from the language of the contract");
see also supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of
determining intent in new-use cases).
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because the parties did not actually foresee the new technology in
either case.9 This line between the possibly foreseeable and
unforeseeable could be drawn at the time when the medium was in
testing stages, in research or development, or-just as easily and
arbitrarily-when the medium was just an idea in its creator's mind.
In each of these cases, the technology existed in some sense, but did
not play a role in formulating the contracting parties' intents."'
Second, if the parties never possess an expectation as to the
allocation of future technologies-which is necessarily true because
in new-use cases no intentions exist-allocating the windfall to one
party does not deprive the other party of its expectations. Because
the author's expectations are not frustrated, it therefore does not
seem unjust to grant new-use rights broadly to licensees.
1' 1
III. COMPARING BARTSCH AND COHEN: BROADER GRANTS OF
NEW-USE RIGHTS PROVE EFFICIENT
Policy issues strongly favor Bartsch's broad grants to new uses
and future technologies. From a utilitarian standpoint, vesting
ownership in publishers and other licensees rather than in creators
results in smaller transaction costs and facilitates the wider
dissemination of information necessary for the development of new
media. Furthermore, such a policy does not contravene the purpose
of the Copyright Act of 1976102 (1976 Act) and does not work as a
disincentive to authorship.
" But see Rey, 990 F.2d at 1387-88 (distinguishing between cases in which the new
medium had not been invented at the time of contract and those in which it had been
invented but had not yet been commercialized).
100 A uniform rule would create more predictable results, of course, by avoiding
this bifurcated treatment and generally rewarding one party-whether it be the creator
or the licensee-with rights to new uses whenever those uses were not actually within
the parties' contemplation. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26 (proposing a
uniform treatment).
101 SeeJohn H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damagesfor Breach of Contract, in THE
EcONOMICS OF CONTRAcT LAw 154, 154 (AnthonyT. Kronman & Richard A. Posner
eds., 1979) (stating that the goal of most common law courts is to protect each party's
expectations); infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (arguing that new-use policy
does not affect authorial incentives).
"0 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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A. Efficiency and Transaction Costs
As William Landes and Richard Posner have observed, "copy-
right law can be explained as a means for promoting [an] efficient
allocation of resources."10 3  Contract interpretation, too, should
maximize utility.' It is widely accepted that the proper alloca-
tion of resources with regard to electronic media is one that
promotes the public's wider access to the information, thereby
enhancing the public welfare." 5 Therefore, windfalls should be
allocated to the party that either incurs the lower transaction costs
in utilizing the work in a new medium10 6 or is in the better posi-
10' William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Copyright Law,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325 (1989). But see Frank P. Darr, Testing an Economic Theory
of Copyright: Historical Materials and Fair Use, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (1991)
(recommending that courts look beyond economics and consider the ethical concerns
of copyright infringement); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166-67 (1992) (suggesting
that infringement invokes a human impulse against unjust enrichment).
104 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICs 25
(1983) (noting that courts are expected to fill in the gaps of contracts because parties
cannot negotiate and draft contracts providing for every conceivable contingency, and
arguing that when courts interpret contracts, they should do so according to
efficiency criteria); AnthonyT. Kronman & Richard A. Posner, Introduction: Economic
Theory and Contract Law, in THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW, supra note 101, at
5 (stating that "the law of contracts has an implicit economic logic-the purpose...
[being] to increase economic efficiency").
1o5 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984) (recognizing "society's... interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce"); INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS § IV(5) (July 1994) ("The Copyright Act exists for the benefit of the
public. To fulfill its constitutional purpose, the law should strive to make the
information contained in protected works of authorship freely available."); Jack B.
Hicks, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 37
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 85, 123 (1990) ("Increased public access to information
contained in automated databases is a major goal of national information policy.").
" The Coase Theorem states that to optimize efficiency when transaction costs
exist, legal rules must seek to minimize those transaction costs. See R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960); see also POLINSKY, supra note 104,
at 13-15 (discussing the Coase Theorem).
An alternative to vesting rights in the better exploiter would be to award the new
uses to the party less able to anticipate the technological development; one would
thereby encourage the party in the better position to acquire such information to do
so. Although it would seem that publishers would be in the best position to
anticipate new technologies, such a presumption is at best speculative. See I.T. Hardy,
An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's Work-Made-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-
VLAJ.L. & ARTs 181, 194 (1988) (noting that "the cheaper-estimator rationale for
resolving disputes over unforeseen uses of works is not borne out either by analysis
or by an examination of the cases"). Guessing which party might have had the better
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tion to exploit the new medium itself."°7
The Bartsch approach reduces the transaction costs imposed on
producers of existing media by channeling existing content into new
media. Rewarding authors with the rights to new uses would im-
pose higher transaction costs because producers or publishers would
have to bargain with creators to use works over new media.'
This policy has been applied convincingly in a broader context.
Landes and Posner use the utilitarian model to justify providing a
monopoly over derivative works to the owner of the underlying
copyrighted work."°9 They conclude:
Transaction costs would be reduced if one person owned both [the
original work's and the derivative work's] copyrights. Of course,
even if they were separately owned to begin with, one of the
owners could buy the other's copyright. But this transaction, with
its attendant costs, can be avoided if the law places the power to
obtain both copyrights in the same person to begin with-and that
is, in effect, what the law does."
0
Landes and Posner, considering existing uses, examine why a single
party is presumed to own all rights to derivative works without con-
sidering the implications of licensing. In the new-use context, the
issue is not whether an unlicensed party infringed the author's copy-
right by creating a derivative work, but whether it is beneficial to
access to information would also result in vesting rights to new uses in the party least
able to exploit the new medium, which is directly contrary to public policy. See id. at
193-95 (arguing that this type of concern precludes courts from employing the better-
exploiter rationale, which is more efficient); supra note 105 and accompanying text
(noting that public policy seeks to maximize public access to new media).
"o7 See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
Ios See Kronman & Posner, supra note 104, at 6 n.6 (noting that one source of high
transaction costs is the existence of a large number of parties). This transaction cost
problem is particularly evident in the newspaper and magazine publishing industry.
Because producers own the copyrights to employees' work under the work-made-for-
hire doctrine, see supra note 34, if producers were granted the copyrights to
freelancers' works, there would be no additional transaction costs for the industry at
all. On the other hand, if freelancers' copyrights were vested in the creators, an
entire structure of licensing would have to exist before the new medium itself
commercially existed or became feasible. Although future creators might retain rights
that would require this licensing structure, the general avoidance of transaction costs
in the short-term subsidizes the development of new technologies. See infra text
accompanying notes 125-25.
109 See Landes & Posner, supra note 103, at 354-55. A derivative work is one that
is adapted from a previous work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). As such, derivative
works encompass new uses.0 Id. at 355.
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infer that the licensee, based on certain derivative rights she owns,
may exploit certain additional derivative rights-namely, new uses.
Furthermore, vesting rights to new technologies in creators will
seldom be in the public interest because the existing media
producers are likely in a better position to exploit or develop new
media with smaller transaction costs."' Just as a movie producer
is more capable than the creator of providing available content for
videocassettes," 2 a newspaper is in a better position than an
author to promote online information services efficiently.' In
the mass-media industry, this synergy is particularly evident because
of the concentration of media power.1
4
In the work-made-for-hire context,n 5 courts traditionally have
in See supra text accompanying notes 90-91, 105 (discussing the benefits of
encouraging the development of new media).
112 See Landes & Posner, supra note 103, at 356 n.40 (finding that from an
economic standpoint the producers of a movie should be entitled to videocassette
rights because they are better able to exploit derivative uses of the movie).
11 Cohen imposes transaction costs on the parties because it requires additional
contracting in order to apply the work to a new medium. The Cohen approach also
creates the risk that authors will be unwilling to license work for new media.
Furthermore, the author might choose to license the work to another producer,
resulting in a loss of the synergy that exists (because of the efficiency produced by
economies of scale, among other reasons) when a single grantee is able to display the
same work over multiple media.
1
1
4 See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY at ix-x (4th ed. 1992) (noting
that control of the major media is consolidated in the hands of 11 corporations, and
that these firms extend their reach to many different media).
n' The comparison between work-made-for-hire cases and new-use cases is
important because the issues confronted in the former parallel those found in the
latter. See David H. Horowitz, Film Creators and Producers vis-a-vis the New Media:
Reflections on the State of Authors' Rights in Audio Visual Works, 13 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. &
ARTs 157,175 (1989) (stating that the work-made-for-hire doctrine provides "the right
to exploit the film-without payment of additional compensation-by means and in
media unknown and uncontemplated at the time of the original employment"). In
both scenarios the issue is whether the party that contracted for the work was granted
ownership of the copyright for unforeseen uses. Comparisons must be made,
however, to the work-made-for-hire doctrine established before the 1976 Act because
that act required for the first time that work-made-for-hire arrangements be stated
explicitly in the contract. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988); Hardy, supra note 106, at 218
& n.82 (noting that the 1976 Act awards copyrights to a commissioning party only in
very limited circumstances, one of which being that the parties must have agreed
beforehand in writing that the work is to be considered a work for hire). In new-use
cases, there is no requirement that grants be placed in the contracts expressly. But
see supra note 40 (discussing the potential presumption in favor of granting only first
serial rights for collective works). Nonetheless, even after the 1976 Act required an
express written statement to allow employers to claim that work was made for hire,
many courts disregarded this explicit congressional mandate and still followed the
better-exploiter rationale. See Hardy, supra note 106, at 219-20 (examining three
federal appeals court cases decided after the 1976 Act that followed the better-
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rewarded employers with new-use windfalls because of their
superior ability to exploit the new medium." 6 As a result, "courts
[have] claimed ... to apply a presumption that both parties
intended the hiring party to own the copyright.""' This policy,
adopted by Bartsch, should also apply when courts assign new-use
rights, unless such a policy would discourage the process of
authorship.
B. Authorial Incentives Are Not Diminished by Interpreting
Contracts to Grant New-Use Rights
The 1976 Act's intention of granting rights to authors "to afford
greater encouragement to the production of literary works of lasting
benefit to the world"11 is not undermined by Bartsch's broad
interpretation of new-use assignments. The granting of copyrights
is designed to "advance the public welfare through the talents of
authors."" 9 The Act, however, is not intended to provide the
maximum incentives possible. 2 ' The Bartsch approach favors the
development and use of new media without diminishing an author's
exploiter rule). Although the Supreme Court later interpreted the 1976 Act to con-
cretely require a written instrument to confer work-made-for-hire status on works
prepared by independent contractors, see Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989), the earlier case law and scholarly analyses shed light
on contractual interpretations where no such writing requirement is presumed to
exist.
116 See Hardy, supra note 106, at 182 (noting that the Second and Seventh Circuits
led the way in "expand[ing] the concept of 'employment' broadly enough to give
copyright ownership to the party better able to exploit the work"). From a normative
standpoint, Hardy agrees, arguing:
Copyright ownership should go to the party in the better position to exploit
the value of the disputed work by bringing it to the public's attention....
[This party is the one] with the greater resources, experience or better
market position-the one who could, in short, more cheaply distribute the
work to the public.
Id. at 181.
11 Id.
1' Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30,36 (1939) (quoting Act
of March 3, 1891, ch. 565,26 Stat. 1106); see also Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the granting of rights to unforeseen
new uses would frustrate the purposes of the 1976 Act).
11 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
12' See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved."); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.").
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incentives.
A new use is "an accretion or unearned increment 121-a
"windfall"'122 -that occurs after the production of a work. The
new-use doctrine is based on the premise that the future medium
was beyond the intentions of the parties; the author, as a result,
could not have expected to profit from such future medium.
1 23
The Bartsch approach, as employed in cases in which the new use
was already invented at the time of the contract, does not provide
a disincentive to authors because it does not frustrate expectations.
In fact, there is no reason to constrain its application to those cases
involving such possibly foreseeable technologies.
1 24
In cases in which a medium was not yet invented, which require
the application of Cohen, there is even less risk of defeating creators'
expectations or of diminishing incentives because the technology at
issue likely was even further from the parties' contemplation.
Furthermore, because future parties are free to bargain as to new
uses, judicial decisions vesting the usage of unspecified future
technologies in the licensee do not create disincentives to future
authors.
C. A Better System: Interpreting Contracts to Grant
New-Use Rights Broadly
For the dual reasons of transaction costs and authorial incen-
tives discussed above, this Comment proposes that grants be
interpreted broadly, following Bartsch, in all circumstances in which
the contract is silent, the parties' intents cannot be gauged, and no
121 Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 F. 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
12 Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (quoting Nagano, supra note 58, at 1184).
12 See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing parties' expectations). In
situations in which nonexclusive licenses maybe found to exist, as with oral contracts,
see supra note 56, authors will still benefit from new uses because nonexclusive
licenses would allow both parties to exploit the new medium. In the case in which
a nonexclusive license has been created, the author is worse off than if no license
were found to exist because the new-use rights are diluted between two or more
parties. Nonetheless, in such circumstances the creator is given some reward beyond
her expectation of none at all.
Even if the freelance author relinquishes her new-use rights, she may reclaim
them 35 years later. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (describing the means by which
licensors may unilaterally terminate transfers and licenses). Because of the existence
of this termination process, authors are deprived of new-use rights for only a fraction
of the term of the copyright.
124 Seesupra text accompanying notes 98-101 (arguing that the foreseeability of the
new use should not determine who receives the windfall).
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unconscionability is present. This approach would be applied
regardless of whether the medium existed when the parties
contracted as long as the medium was not commercialized or
otherwise rendered foreseeable at the time of the contract.
The one-time windfall from a new use, in effect, is used to
subsidize the licensee in her effort-to develop the new medium
25
rather than to enrich the grantor beyond her expectations. This
subsidy is particularly well suited for infant media, whose economic
feasibility may be uncertain until enough content is available therein
to bolster consumer demand. The subsidies would apply only to
ambiguous contracts that predated the medium; as the medium
develops and becomes viable, it ceases to be considered a new use,
and the subsidy, appropriately, discontinues. This policy spares new
media with uncertain futures from cumbersome licensing proce-
dures until the media become commercially available. Clearly, as a
matter of policy, it is better to develop a new medium,126 allowing
the licensee to retain any rights that reasonably can be said to flow
from the contract, than to reward an author with remuneration
beyond her expectations at the expense of the public interest.
12
IV. THE NEW-USE DOCTRINE APPLIED TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA
Following the analysis described in Part II, courts should look
first for intent or unconscionability when assigning new-use rights
for online systems and CD-ROMs. Assuming that neither can be
found, which is likely in the absence of contracts containing future
"'
5 Seesupra text accompanying notes 108-09 (explaining how such a subsidy would
reduce transaction costs).
12 See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155 (preferring to grant rights to the new use to the
licensee rather than to "risk ... a deadlock between the grantor and grantee [that]
might prevent the work's being shown over the new medium at all"); Madoon v.
Vitagraph, Inc., 30 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir. 1929) ("The law always favors the free and
unrestricted use of property, and doubts and ambiguities should be resolved in favor
of the natural right to such free use and enjoyment, and against restrictions
thereof.").
127 But see Nagano, supra note 58, at 1184-85 (recommending a wide usage of the
narrow Cohen rule, conferring the behefits of the new use to the licensor, and
suggesting that such a policy would enable both parties to "share in the benefits of
the new use"). Although this policy certainly enables the licensor to share the
benefits, it does not provide any benefit to the licensee. The licensee is forced to pay
to use the work in the new medium as if there were no preexisting contract at all.
The "windfall" described by Nagano is the right to sell the work for use on the new
medium, a right provided exclusively, under this analysis, to the grantor. See id. at
1184; see also Hardy, supra note 106, at 190-91 ("[I]t is equally true that were creators
to retain the rights to these unforeseen uses, they would reap the windfall.").
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technology provisions, the policy issues surrounding the fairness of
vesting rights in a particular party should be considered. 2 s Such
a reliance on policy is particularly necessary in the publishing
community because contracts in that industry tend to be unsophisti-
cated. 29
When interpreting contracts that precede the development of
electronic media, courts traditionally apply the Cohen approach and
vest rights in the grantor.s' Therefore, a court first needs to
consider the date of development of the new media. It is difficult
to determine exactly when online services were actually created; the
period of development of computer databases extended from the
late-1950s until the mid-1970s.'-' This aspect of Cohen is a major
drawback: a concrete date must be established, even though the
advent of online systems occurred over several decades. But,
because online systems were not developed in a manner such that
they had commercial potential until about 1973, that year should be
used to mark the beginning of modern online systems. 3 2 The
date of development of the CD-ROM, in contrast, is much clearer
because optical technologies were invented in 1980.as Therefore,
for contracts that preceded these dates, rights to the electronic uses
presumably would vest in the grantor.
For contracts entered into after these dates, the Bartsch
approach would conventionally be applied.14 Bartsch grants rights
128 See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
129 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
"'2 See supra part II.C.2 (describing the Cohen approach); see also, e.g., Rey v.
Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that the approach in Cohen may
"be appropriate where a particular 'new use' was completely unforeseeable and
therefore could not possibly have formed part of the bargain between the parties at the
time of the original grant"); Bourne Co. v. Walt Disney Co., 1992 WL 170686, at *6
(S.D.N.Y.July 1, 1992) ("In Bartsch, the Second Circuit confined its holding to cases
where the disputed new use ... existed at the time the parties signed their
agreement. It expressly distinguished situations where the new use was totally
unknown at the time the parties entered into their contract."), rev'd on other grounds,
976 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1992).
13 Seesupra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (tracing the early history of online
systems).1
1
2 See supra note 15 (pinpointing the development of the Dow Jones News/
Retrieval Service, the first large-scale online information system, as occurringin 1973
or 1974).
133 See supra text accompanying note 26.
'4 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86 (describing when to use the Bartsch
approach); see also Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (noting that under such circumstances "the
courts will presume that at least the possibility of nonspecific 'new uses' was
foreseeable by the contracting parties at the time the contract was drafted"); Bartsch,
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to the new media to the licensee if the new media do not fall within
the ambiguous penumbral definitions of the existing media rights
granted or expressly retained."' 5 Ordinarily, Bartsch distinguishes
the new media based on the method of distribution."3 6 Online
systems, distributed by telecommunications networks, bear no
resemblance to the traditional distribution of newspapers, maga-
zines, and books. Accordingly, online systems would not fall within
any preestablished penumbra from printed periodical sales, and the
rights thereto might well be considered to have been retained. CD-
ROM systems, however, share more in common with traditional
distribution schemes in that they are bought and sold as discrete
products. But CD-ROMs are still distinguishable from preexisting
media in their means of distribution because they are not yet
typically purchased at newsstands or bookstores and are distributed
after the print publication." 7 As a result, CD-ROM products also
might not be considered to have fallen within the scope of the
grant. A court might then conclude that the new-use rights were
retained by the licensor. Such a resolution, however, overlooks the
importance of efficiency concerns.
Although neither medium falls squarely within the scope of the
grant, they do not fall precisely outside of that grant either.
Without a detailed written contract there can be no references to
existing rights from which penumbral definitions can be extracted.
As a result, in this type of case, there exists a true "windfall," a
bundle of rights that neither party forcefully can argue to own.
Courts addressing this issue should adopt Bartsch's reasoning and
grant the new-use rights to the licensee, the "single person who can
make the copyrighted work available to the public over the
penumbral medium." 3 ' Therefore, the future technology rights
391 F.2d at 154 (distinguishing between not "know[ing]... of the [new medium's]
existence" and not "know[ing] of the new medium's potential").
' See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 40, § 10.10[B], at 10-93 (finding the Bartsch approach to be preferable
"because the courts are equipped to determine the outer limits of the reasonable
meaning of a term when it may well be impossible to locate a supposed true and
single intent of the parties that generally never in fact existed").
136 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
1.7 See supra note 23 (discussing the inherent problems with creating timely CD-
ROMs). Books, if distributed on CD-ROM in a manner similar to that of the print
version, arguably fall within the penumbral range of the grant.
Is Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155; see also supra text accompanying notes 90-91
(discussing the Bartsch approach's encouragement of expanding the scope of the grant
to include new uses).
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for contracts signed in this interim period between a medium's
invention and its commercialization should belong to licensees.
Once a medium becomes clearly recognizable through its
commercialization and ceases to be new, however, it might be
presumed that authors reserved their rights in the absence of an
explicit grant."5 9 The online industry, for example, began to
flourish in 1982.140 CD-ROMs were commercially introduced in
1985 and achieved success more quickly than online systems.
14 1
Accordingly, 1985 represents the last year for which CD-ROM rights
might be presumed to have been granted.
The bifurcated treatment provided by Bartsch and Cohen
produces an anomalous result: Whereas authors who contracted
before a medium's advent would be vested with new-use rights (as
might those who contracted after its commercialization), only those
who bargained during this intermediate period would be considered
to have granted electronic rights to the licensee. By ignoring the
arbitrary foreseeability distinction of Cohen and Bartsch, however,
courts would be spared the difficulty of determining exactly when
a medium was no longer inchoate, allowing for a more uniform
treatment.14 2  In addition, this proposal avoids vesting rights in
one class of creators (those who contracted before the medium's
advent) but not in another (those in the intermediate period who
contracted after the advent but before the commercialization of the
new medium), despite the fact that the creators possessed the same
intentions, or lack thereof, with respect to their licenses. 143 As a
result, this more consistent analysis presumes that all grantors
before a medium's commercialization date have granted their
electronic rights to the licensee.
This treatment provides a subsidy to those publishers trying to
make content available over new media during the formative years
of electronic media development. Before new media become
established, authors do not expect additional compensation for their
works. 144  To reward the authors with a windfall is to deprive
1' See supra note 40 (describing the 1976 Act's presumption of limited grants as
to existing uses). This Comment takes no position regarding contract interpretation
for existing uses and only points out that such uses are likely to vest in the grantor.
140 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
1 Seesupra text accompanying notes 97-100 (discussinghow the foreseeability test
often ignores the intentions of the grantor of the license).
144 See supra part III.B (arguing that authors' incentives are not undermined by
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society of efficient information distribution.
145
This Comment does not suggest that contracts after a medium's
commercialization always be interpreted to have granted rights to
electronic media. By the 1990s these electronic media were no
longer in their infancy-they were present rather than future
technologies-and another analysis, beyond the scope of this
Comment, should be used to gauge the parties' intents at such a
stage. By this time, parties might possess certain expectations
regarding electronic media rights, and courts should examine the
bargaining process to determine which rights were licensed in the
absence of explicit provisions.
V. EPILOGUE: CHANGES IN BARGAINING FOR ELECTRONIC
MEDIA RIGHTS
The bargaining favored by the 1976 Act 146 has already begun
to occur between publishers and journalists for the rights not only
to the new-but-existing technologies of online systems and CD-
ROM, but also to future technologies. Since Tasini v. New York
Times147 rose to national prominence in December 1993, the
publishing industry has begun explicitly to address future technolo-
gy issues. 148 Book publishers, for example, have put new contracts
on the bargaining table that define the percentage of royalties from
electronic uses to which authors are entitled.'4 9 Although some
broadly granting new-use rights).
' See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the policies favoring
wider public access to information).
146 See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) ("Nothing in the bill
derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and to sue for
breaches of contract ... ."); Ramona L. Paetzold, Comment, Contracts Enlarging a
Copyright Owner's Rights: A Framework for Determining Unenforceability, 68 NEB. L. REV.
816, 817 (1989) ("[Tlhe copyright system views freedom of contract as beneficial to
the purposes and goals of the copyright market itself.").
147 93-Civ.-8678 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 16, 1993); see supra text accompanying notes
41-43 (discussing the Tasini case).
14 See, e.g.,James A. Martin, Computers Make It Easy to Steal, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr.
17, 1994, at CI (discussing the legal implications of the increased vulnerability of
copyrighted materials because of technology advances).
149 See e.g., id. at Cl (describing Random House's contract in which authors
receive between 10% and 16% of sales of paperback or hardcover books, but only 5%
of revenues from sales from electronic publishing); Moran, supra note 21 (discussing
Random House's new standard contract between authors and publishers, "setting a
flat five percent royalty on electronic versions of authors' works and retaining all
future publishing rights"); Calvin Reid, Authors, Agents Pan New Random Media Rights
Contract, PUBULSHERS WKLY., Apr. 18, 1994, at 11 (discussing reaction of publishing
industry to Random House's new standard contract).
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authors have described the new contracts as "brazen" 150 or as
"contracts from hell,"151 there is reason to believe that the bar-
gaining process has only begun.
52
When the courts announce their views on the new-use doctrine
and electronic publishing, there will no longer be an issue of future-
technology clauses and electronic media. The one-time windfall of
electronic media either will have been used to subsidize the nascent
electronic media industry or will have been granted to authors to
use as they wish. But this resolution will only suffice until the next
new technology arrives,' when courts will be confronted with
interpreting the contracts that are now being written.
CONCLUSION
The electronic media have profoundly and permanently changed
the conventional means by which information is distributed. These
changes have created a new bundle of rights whose ownership is
uncertain. Even in contracts drafted with great care it is difficult to
determine whether new-use rights are meant to have been trans-
l0Reid, supra note 149, at 11 (quoting the Authors Guild).
5 Carmody, supra note 5, at B20.
See id. (stating that "[w]riters who complain ... are often able to have huge
chunks [of the contract] thrown out the window," and "[w]riters whom magazines
'really need have been successful in throwing the whole contract out of the window'"
(quoting Dan Carlinsky, chair of contracts for the American Society ofJournalists and
Authors)); see also Dana Blankenhorn, Writers Suefor Online Copyright, Newsbytes News
Network, Dec. 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that
in the past "some freelance writers have succeeded.., in keeping their copyrights").
153 See, e.g., MARCIA L. DE SONNE, ADVANCED BROADCAST/MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES:
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPACTS IN THE '90S AND BEYOND 83-102 (1992)
(discussing new media technologies);Jeannine Aversa, U.S. Planfor Global Information
Network, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 16, 1995, at A7 (discussing the Clinton administration's
plan "for a worldwide network that could let people exchange vast amounts of
information as cheaply and as easily as sending a fax");Joanne Kelly, FCC Paves Way
for New Nationwide Radio Service, Reuter Bus. Rep.,Jan. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Reubus File (noting that the FCC has "set aside space on the airwaves
for a new [digital] coast-to-coast radio service that would beam compact disc quality
sound to tiny satellite dishes in cars and homes across the country"); Neil Winton,
Interactive TV Tempts Viewers with Computer Power, Reuter Bus. Rep., Feb. 19, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File (noting that interactive television will
turn viewers into "hyperactive foragers for entertainment and news" able to "direct
their own movies, offering the choice of various story lines as the plot unfolds");
Patricia Zengerle, Media Giant Launches Cable Network of Future, Reuter Bus. Rep.,
Dec. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File (describing "the Full
Service Network," Time Warner's "new interactive cable-TV network" that provides
"[m]ovies ... available on demand... almost instantly" that can be rewound, fast-
forwarded, or paused by the subscriber).
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ferred or retained, unless all rights are granted. New-use rights
cannot be defined with precision at the time of contract because by
definition they do not exist until some point after the agreement
has been consummated. This problem is only exacerbated in the
publishing industry where crude agreements, which until recently
had been sufficient, are prevalent, if not the norm.
New-use rights are unlike other types of contractual rights
because they do not form any part of the intent between contracting
parties. As a result, they represent a windfall such that neither
party has a greater claim to those rights. Since the early part of the
century, courts have struggled to allocate these rights; the courts'
approaches together establish a dividing line for when rights are
presumed to have been granted and retained. The common-law
boundary has established that, although rights are retained when the
contract precedes the invention of the medium or possibly when it
follows the medium's widespread commercialization, those rights
are granted during the intermediate period between invention and
commercialization. This scheme results in a peculiar dichotomy
since the parties' intentions, or more properly the lack thereof, are
identical at all points prior to the medium's commercialization.
The novel treatment described in this Comment properly
balances the incentives needed by authors to create and the stimuli
required for nascent media to flourish. By awarding the rights to
new uses to the grantee-publisher for all contracts that preceded
commercialization of the medium, short-term transaction costs are
eliminated for that medium; this approach allows publishers to
channel content into the new medium, helping that medium achieve
viability. Perhaps more importantly, once the medium becomes
commercialized, when it no longer requires subsidies, more recent
contracts are no longer presumed to grant new-use rights. The
incentives of authorship are maintained and society benefits from
new media development.
